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Berislav JANDRIĆ*
 “Father, forgive them; for they do not know what they do”
(Luke 23,34)
I.
Daily newspapers are a secondary source of research and reconstruc-
tion of historical events. The press reports and transmits certain messag-
es to the public, and is in the position to shape public opinion. As the 
media in totalitarian systems are in the hands of the ruling party, which 
was the case in Socialist Yugoslavia (Socijalistička Federativna Republika 
Jugoslavija – SFRJ), they were not free or in the position to independ-
ently publish and express public opinion. The task of such media, espe-
cially in the period between 1945 and 1952, was to promote the Party’s 
ideas. Media were non-autonomous, controlled and forced to publish 
information and interpretations as ordered by the Party and state top 
structures, or the Department for Agitation and Propaganda (Agitprop) 
of the Central Committee (Centralnl komitet - CK) of the Communist 
Party of Yugoslavia (Komunistička partija Jugoslavije - KPJ) and CK of 
the Communist Party of Croatia (Komunistička partija Hrvatske - KPH). 
Agitprop was functioning in a strict hierarchy and in a centralised man-
ner, “taking care” of “the image” of the entire social life in the state. As 
an institution, it was on the top of the information system and was giv-
ing basic ideological and political guidelines, and in a number of cases, it 
acted as a supreme arbiter. It is generally known that “the party, or its lead-
ing core, or its supreme leader, is the only one who has the means of deci-
sion-making and coercion, media and propaganda”1. In the period men-
tioned, its activities were aimed at the “establishment and control over the 
* Berislav Jandrić, Ph. D., Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb, Republic of Croatia
1 Claude Lefort, Prijepor o komunizmu (orig: Controversy on Communism), trans. Radmila 
Zdjelar (Zagreb: Librokon, 2000), p. 11.
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centralised information system”.2 The link between the higher and lower 
organisation was strong, hierarchically organised, and the communication 
between them was being carried out through “directives.” The most impor-
tant Agitprop’s sector, was the “press sector,”3 which was functioning in all 
republics of the former Yugoslav state and was a supreme “censor” decid-
ing what was not to be published for reasons of state secrecy or political 
delicacy.4 “The person in charge of the press and agitation /.../ was on the 
watch so that political and other opinions in the press do not depart from 
the correct Party line, and that the directives of the central press are applied 
and correctly interpreted. /.../ decides what kind of articles should be print-
ed and what the articles should be about, what needs to be emphasised. 
/.../ Apart from the total control of everything that was leaving the print-
ing plants, there was a concrete requirement of what and how to write.”5 
Namely, the Party, or Agitprop, which was controlling the press and dictat-
ing most of the messages, even the headlines published in newspapers, was 
negatively evaluating the “dry reporting on events” as well as “the so-called 
objectivity”; such an approach was not considered to be on the Party line. 
Editorials were usually written by prominent politicians, and their role was 
mainly to give directives. In fact, the state and leading Party structures creat-
ed and shaped all the important political decisions, and President Josip Broz 
Tito himself had the power to make final decisions, i.e., “he was sharp and 
firm against any opposition actions.”6 The strictly centralised Communist 
Party of Yugoslavia created and controlled the political strategy, as well as 
everyday life, cultural and social policies, the economy, and especially the 
judiciary, the police [militia] and the Yugoslav People’s Army. Everything 
was “in the hands” and under the control of the Party leaders or Politbiro of 
CK KPJ. “The mobilisation of the masses”, carried out for political purposes 
through newspapers and other media, was the main task of the press in that 
period. When total control was established over all of the media in the state, 
public opinion of the citizens, i.e., the masses,7 was to be shaped in keep-
ings with the totalitarian ideology of the KPJ.8 The citizenary, public opin-
2 Katarina Spehnjak, “Uloga novina u oblikovanju javnog mnijenja u Hrvatskoj 1945.-
1952.”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest (hereafter: ČSP) 25 (Zagreb: 1993), No. 2-3: 165.
3 In that period, the head of Agitprop’s “Press Sector” in Croatia was Ivo Sarajčić, a candida-
te for membership in the CK KPH, elected at the Second Congress of the KPH.
4 In the first years after the war, “the data on the achievements and the results of harvest” 
were considered a state secret, and newspapers were not allowed to publish them.
5 Zlata Knezović, “Obilježja boljševizacije hrvatske kulture (1945.-1947.),” ČSP 24 (Zagreb: 
1992), No. 1: 106.
6 Dušan Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest (Zagreb: Golden marketing, 1999), p. 227 
7 Gvozden Flego, “Dubinska psihologija masa, politika,” Treći program hrvatskog radija, vol. 
35 (Zagreb: 1992), p.5. 
8 “Crkva za dostojanstvo čovjeka protiv totalitarizma XX. Stoljeća,” Obnovljeni život (herea-
fter: OŽ), vol. 1-2 (Zagreb: 1996);  Raymond Aron, Demokracija i totalitarizam (orig: Democracy 
and Totalitarianism), trans. Gordana V. Popović, (Zagreb: Gandalf, 1996), Hannah Arendt, 
Totalitarizam (orig: Totalitarianism), trans. Mirjana Pajić Jurinić, (Zagreb: Gandalf, 1996).  
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ion, newspapers, etc. - “are a part of the propaganda and agitation ‘plant’ in 
which ‘the masses’ are only ‘educated’ for the new society”.9 Therefore, it is 
not hard to agree with those historians who argue that the communist/total-
itarian government was attaching considerable importance to public opin-
ion, never neglecting it, but on the other hand paralysing and neutralising it 
when it was not in the line of the realisation of their ideas. 
It is not unusual that the KPJ/KPH, having learned the lesson from the 
experience of the All-Federal Communist Party – (Bolsheviks) (Svesavezna 
komunistička partija – /boljševika/ - SKP /b/) was exterminating anything 
that “might get out of the Party’s control, any association that was a sign of 
an independent initiative, any relationship, any communication with unpre-
dictable effects. /.../ because nothing is as dangerous as a free flow of public 
expression.”10 The communist idea in Croatia, unlike other Yugoslav repub-
lics, did not strike deep roots in real life,11 partly because of the Catholic reli-
gion, which traditionally has had a status of moral authority. 
II.
Newspapers, as a printed medium, use photographs and caricatures, apart 
from the texts. Visualisation of the events from the past is presented best with 
photographs, or more precisely, documentary photographs. Caricature as a vis-
ual expression deforms reality on purpose and is mainly used to show the weak-
nesses, flaws and deformities of individuals and the society; they are also an 
inexhaustible source of mockery, exposure to ridicule and abuse. Newspapers 
had the task in that period to inform the public (citizens) with those individuals 
and groups, and institutions, which were dissatisfied and resisting the new gov-
ernment. They were publishing names and surnames of individuals, who were 
sentenced to long-term imprisonment, forced labour, confiscation of property, 
loss of political and civil rights, etc., all for purpose of compromising those who 
were opposing the policy of the new, Communist government. 
This text will present a small selection of articles from the Zagreb daily 
paper Vjesnik12, and Borba13, a KPJ organ. Those newspapers had a consider-
9 K. Spehnjak, “Uloga novina” p. 169. 
10 C. Lefort, Prijepor o komunizmu, p. 56.
11 In late 1945, the KPH had 47,205 members: Croats 30,634 or 65.0%, Serbs 14,509 or 
30.7% and other nationalities 2,062 or 4.3%. In late 1946, the number of members of the 
Party of Croatia was 58,441 members: Croats 39,560 or  67.7%, Serbs 16,438 or 28.1% and 
others 2,443 or  4.2%. (B. Jandrić, “Komunistička partija Hrvatske 1945. – 1952. Organizacija, 
uloga, djelovanje,” (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Zagreb, 1995), p. 90.)
12 The first issue of Vjesnik (Politički vjesnik) was published on 24 June 1940. Vjesnik 
Jedinstvene narodnooslobodilačke fronte Hrvatske was published on 12 May 1945 in Zagreb. 
Since then, it has been published daily; with another publisher, on 30 November 1945, it chan-
ged the name into Vjesnik Narodnog fronta Hrvatske. The largest circulation was in 1945, with 
more than 90,000 copies a day. (B. Jandrić, “Izvori i literatura za proučavanje Komunističke 
partije Hrvatske - Saveza komunista Hrvatske 1945. – 1978,” ČSP (Zagreb: 1982), No. 2: 169.)
13 The first issue of Borba, a KPJ organ – it never had a legal status of a newspaper - was 
printed in Zagreb on 19 February 1922. (Look in: Stanislava Koprivica-Oštrić, “Pedeseta godi-
šnjica Borbe”, ČSP (Zagreb, 1972), No. 1: 131.) 
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able circulation in those times. The articles, supplements, analyses, reports, 
interviews, photographs and caricatures published on the pages of those 
newspapers were glorifying and promoting the Communist ideas on the 
“revolutionary metamorphosis” of the society, and the extinction of reli-
gion or Roman Catholicism. Namely, some “Bolshevik” forces in the CK 
KPJ/KPH wanted, at whatever cost, to create a copy of the atheist atavist 
USSR in the territory of the new state. During the war, the Communists 
thought that after the war they would organise, in fact impose the social 
system on the model of the USSR, in which the Party would have unlimit-
ed power.14 The Bolshevisation of the Yugoslav/Croatian army, judiciary15, 
culture, art, sport, and society on the whole, was being introduced in a sys-
tematic and organised manner. Many Croatian intellectuals and people 
active in culture, as well as Party leaders/officials were taken by surprise. 
Instead of the promoted and promised “freedoms, there began strict cen-
sorship, firm Party’s pressure and the Party-dictated content and model”.16 
Such pro-Soviet forces, which dominated  the CK KPJ/KPH and the society 
as a whole, were determining the character and the course of the relations 
between the Communist Party and the Catholic Church, which were full of 
tensions. Unfortunately, that was a big step backward, as there was a break-
up with the national tradition and the past, as well as the national future of 
Croatia. However, one should not ignore the fact that “during the war, the 
Communists managed to colour the liberation requests of the people with 
anti-religious and especially anti-Catholic nuances. /…../ With the arriv-
al of the partisan forces led by the KPJ to Zagreb, it became obvious that 
the anti-religious, and at least anti-Catholic, elements were dominating”.17 
The Party leaders referred to religion in a very insulting and vulgar man-
ner, especially targeting the Catholic Church and even Archbishop Alozije 
Stepinac, who was called “Ustasha, a cut-throat, war criminal, terrorist”, etc. 
The aim was to prepare and shape public opinion for the announced trial 
against Archbishop Stepinac. All over the country, newspapers started pub-
14 Bolshevisation was present in all segments of the society. The structure of the army and 
the “militia”, ranks, organisation of judiciary, schooling system, influence in culture, sport, 
five-year plans, “personality cult”, military parades on May 1st, etc, were organised on the 
model of the USSR. The KPJ Statute was literally a copy of the SKP(b) Statute, article by arti-
cle. The main inspiration and the prayer-book of Yugoslav/Croatian Communists until 1950 
was the History of the All-Union Communist Party - Bolsheviks /SKP(b)/, it was a dogma 
which had to be beileved in, and its teaching was a ceremony studied by the Party’s cadre in 
400 lessons. (B. Jandrić, “Obrazovanje kadrova KPH 1945. - 1949. godine”, Povijesni prilozi 
(hereafter: PP), (Zagreb, 1990), vol. 9: 240.) 
15 The Justice Department of ZAVNOH requested the purchase of the expert literature on 
the reorganisation of judiciary in the USSR (“whole judiciary legislation, theoretical revi-
ew of the basic issues from that area, especially as regards the organisation of courts and the 
right of representation in the USSR, as well as the text-books in the field of judiciary legi-
slation, political economy, criminology and sociology, published in the USSR”) (ZAVNOH 
(Zagreb: 1985), p. 83). 
16 Z. Knezović, “Obilježja boljševizacije,” p. 101.
17 Jure Krišto, Katolička crkva u totalitarizmu 1945. – 1990. (Zagreb: Globus, 1997), p. 38.
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lishing articles and reports, often false, unargumented and fictitious, with 
the tendency of creating discord within the congregation, disunion with-
in the clergy, and stimulating atheism, consciously giving up religion and 
the beliefs stemming from it. Vjesnik18 from Zagreb had a leading role in 
that. In the campaign, humorous and satirical magazines Kerempuh and 
Pomet, presenting “the most abominable caricatures with insulting expres-
sions and intentionally distorted facts”19, played an important role. After the 
trial, Kerempuh published a special edition called Lojzekovih 1000 grijeha 
(Alojzije’s 1000 Sins) (referring to Alojzije Stepinac). There was no end to 
the Communist mocking, such as: “Fratre, popove, švercere i lopove, nabit 
ćemo u topove” (“Friars, priests, black marketers and thieves will be loaded 
into cannons”), or songs like “Imam kapu sa tri roga, mi idemo protiv Boga, 
al’ nećemo protiv Hrista, jer je i on komunista”20 (I have a tricorn hat, we go 
against God, but not against Christ, as he also is a Communist), which were 
sung by groups of young members of the Young Communist Association of 
Yugoslavia (Savez komunističke omladine Jugoslavije – SKOJ) and fanatic 
Communists, in order to create the atmosphere of fear. The state and Party 
leading structures never gave to the press under their control the approv-
al for the application of the principle “audiatur et altera pars”. Because of 
that injustice, Stepinac submitted on, 21 July 1945, a petition to the Prime 
Minister of the NRH in which he stated, “that the Catholic press was in deed 
silenced”.21 “The parish priests of Zagreb were not allowed to publish their 
paper because there was not enough paper. A bit later, without any court 
decision, soldiers took from the cellar of ‘Narodna tiskara’ and my home 
wagons of paper for the Party’s printing plant ‘Naprijed’, as if the Party’s 
printing plant was a state-owned company”.22 According to the Act on the 
Press, not even the Catholic Church’s corrections of false allegations were 
being published.
Historians have proven that Stepinac was a victim of the totalitari-
an regime, and that the “actual prosecutor” was the Communist Party. His 
sentence was in fact the sentence against the Catholic Church in Croatia, 
against Roman Catholicism and the Vatican, and was passed much earli-
er, long before his arrest. It was not passed by the state judges, but by the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia/Croatia. With the assistance of the men-
18 In that period, the editor-in-chief of  Vjesnik was Josip Kirigin.  
19 Aleksa Benigar, Alojzije Stepinac (Rome: ZIRAL, 1974), p. 525.
20 Vladimir Dedijer, Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita, vol. 2 (Rijeka: Mladost, 
1981), p. 575.
21 Before the war, in the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia, there had been 152 religious papers, 
whose monthly circulation had been reaching 700,000 copies. (From: Branko Petranović, 
“Aktivnost rimokatoličkog klera protiv sređivanja prilika u Jugoslaviji /mart 1945. - septem-
bar 1946./,” Istorija XX veka. Zbornik radova (Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, odelenje za 
istorijske nauke, 1963), p. 308. (hereafter: B. Petranović, “Aktivnost rimokatoličkog klera”) 
22 A. Benigar, Alojzije Stepinac, p. 485. 
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tioned daily papers, supported by radio shows, a show was directed for “the 
broad masses”23.
III.
The official ideology of the Communist Party had a negative attitude 
toward religion, and especially toward the Catholic Church in Croatia. 
The KPJ undoubtedly supported atheism. In practice, it was obvious that it 
was not “reluctant in imposing atheism as an official ‘religion’ by use of the 
whole official apparatus”.24 On the other hand, in the Catholic Church and 
among Croatian believers the dominating opinion was that Communism 
was an “ungodly” movement, which the KPJ had been trying to justify and 
defend with its entire means, during the Second World War. Atheism did 
not echo positively among partisan-believers, who were in the first years of 
the war the majority of the combat potential of the army in Croatia.25 The 
Communist monopoly on power was disturbed only by the Catholic Church, 
which the government could not put under its  control, as they did with all 
other segments of  society. The persecution against the “people’s enemies” 
started immediately after the war. The “People’s courts”26, under the Party’s 
strong influence, used emergency procedures, working quickly and efficient-
ly, without the usual procedures (engagement of attorneys, brevity of proce-
dure, witnesses, etc.), ensuring that the prisons were full.  The most impor-
tant guilt “to be punished was ‘the perpetrator’s threat to the society’ that 
is, the judgement of the secret police, Department for the Protection of the 
People (OZN), who determined who was dangerous for the regime and who 
was to be eliminated”.27 The decisions of the “People’s courts” were not based 
on legal regulations due to a strong pressure and influence of the Party. 
According to the political leaders themselves, “before going to certain villag-
es and cities, the Communist officials were receiving ‘precise instructions on 
how to act in each particular case, how to behave toward the populations”.28 
Communists were “always acting as people who give judgements on eve-
rything /.../ moreover, an eminent characteristic of Communists was that 
they judged non-Communists”29. After the entry into Zagreb, “the partisan 
units had to arrest the Archbishop, but were hindered by Andrija Hebrang,” 
23 Vinko Nikolić, U službi domovine, studije, ogledi, portreti. (Zagreb: Knjižnica Hrvatske 
revije, 1996).
24 J. Krišto, Katolička crkva, p. 36.
25 Of 121,351 combatants of all corps in Croatia on 30 November 1944, the national com-
position was: 73,327 or 60,40% Croats, 34,753 or 28,64% Serbs, 3,316 or 2.75 % Muslims, 284 
or 0,25% Jews and 9,671 or 7,96 % others. (From: Ivo Jelić, Komunisti i revolucija. (Zagreb: 
Globus, 1977), p. 199).
26 The Act on the Organisation of People’s Courts was passed on 26 August 1945.
27 Lav Znidarčić, Alojzije Stepinac, O stotoj godišnjici rođenja (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska - 
Targa, 1998), p. 68.
28 Marko Belinić, Put kroz život (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1985), p. 137
29 C. Lefort, Prijepor o komunizmu, p. 19
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who was then the head of the KPH.30 At the same time, some of the parti-
san “leaders”, wanted to “ immediately kill” the Archbishop, ‘but Vladimir 
Bakarić stood against that, saying that that would cause damage to the par-
tisans, because the whole nation was on Stepinac’s side.’”31 The sufferings 
continued, and “until the end of May 1945, the Communist partisans killed 
many innocent Croats in Dubrovnik, Imotski, Šibenik, Gospić, Karlovac, 
Osijek and elsewhere, whomever they considered to be a potential opposi-
tion to the Communist ruling system in the post-war period.”32 As early as 
on 11 May 1945, on Jelačić Square in Zagreb, “comrade Marko Belinić (at 
that time, a member of the CK of Croatia) attacked Archbishop Stepinac, 
saying ‘that Zagreb did not belong to Stepinac.’”33 There  “does not exist 
Stepinac’s Church.”34 “The treacherous policy of Maček and Stepinac was 
in vain /.../ today Zagreb responds to Stepinac, and to Maček, it responds to 
the oppressors and traitors of our peoples....”35 In addition, Vladimir Nazor, 
the President of the Regional Anti-fascist Council of the People’s Liberation 
of Croatia (Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske - 
ZAVNOH), in the same place attacked Stepinac saying “and you, the quiet 
bells of Kaptol, chime in this moment of joy of the Croatian people.”36 At 
the first meeting of educational workers held on 25 May 1945, Archbishop 
Stepinac was again severely condemned. Because he had stood up for Jews 
and Serbs during the war, “justification” for such acts was explained with 
the slander saying that he had been doing that because “he had had a Jewish 
mistress”.37 The conflict between the state and Party, on one side, and the 
ecclesiastic, on the other, was unavoidable.38 The “democratic rights” guar-
anteed by the Constitution of the FNRJ and the NRH39, which included the 
right to the freedom of worship, were only declarative.40 The new govern-
30 Vladimir Horvat, “Nadbiskup Alojzije Stepinac i totalitarni režimi”, OŽ, vol. 1-2 (Zagreb: 
1996), p. 160.
31 Ibid. 
32 Ivo Perić, Povijest Hrvata (Zagreb: Centar za transfer tehnologije, 1997), p. 244.
33 L. Znidarčić, Alojzije Stepinac, p. 27.  
34 It is not known who was the first to use the sintagm “Stepinac’s Church.” Stepinac himself 
was firmly rejecting such ideas. Ibid., p. 52.
35 Vjesnik, 12 May 1945.
    I would like to express my appreciation to Mrs. Deša Kolar for her kind co-operativeness 
and the others from the Newspaper and Documentation Centre in Vjesnik.
36 Vjesnik, 17 May 1945.
37 L. Znidarčić, Alojzije Stepinac, p. 27. 
38 B. Jandrić, “Komunistički totalitarizam u sukobu s Katoličkom crkvom u Hrvatskoj 
(1945.-1953.),” Dijalog povjesničara-historičara, vol. 2, (Zagreb: 2000), p. 617.
39 The Constitution of the FNRJ was adopted on 31 January 1946, Article 25 (Comp.: 
Constitution of NRH, Article 26) freedom of conscience and faith, separation od the Church 
from the state, freedom of activities of religious communities, etc., Article 39, separation of 
school from the Church. 
40 The position of religious communities in Yugoslavia (Croatia), [Constitutional and sta-
tutory provisions], was defined in the documents of the Anti-Fascist Counsel of the People’s
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ment considered its citizen - believers, especially Roman Catholics, to be 
enemies of the state. The resistance of the leaders of the Catholic Church 
headed by Archbishop Stepinac against the non-democratic conduct of the 
new government, as well as their refusal to co-operate with the new system, 
were the reasons, which “forced” the KPJ General Secretary and the Prime 
Minister of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, to activate the repressive state appa-
ratus against them.41 Namely, the Communist government was doing eve-
rything to diminish the reputation of the Catholic Church and compromise 
it in the society, and to exclude the broad “masses” from religious servic-
es, which were not publicly prohibited, but those attending were immedi-
ately excluded from public and social life. However, the clergy “could not 
and did not want to fight the government of the new system in an open 
and organised manner.”42 The Party and the Church were fighting fierce-
ly for the influence and positions in the society.43 The Party was fighting 
to win the masses over and deter the population from religion, i.e. to “lib-
erate them from mysticism,”44 and the Church was fighting for recognition 
and respect (demarginalisation) in the society and politics, on which the 
Party insisted. As the believers did not approve of the process, groups of 
members of the Young Communist Association of Yugoslavia (SKOJ) and 
the KPJ were undertaking actions of “forced persuasion” (physical attacks 
and abuse of priests, disruption (prohibition) of processions, closing down 
of junior seminaries,45 destruction of the church property, etc.),46 and the 
organising of various sport events and rallies during services and church 
holidays,47 which the population, and especially the school children, had to 
Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) and the Regional  Anti-Fascist Counsel of the People’s 
Liberation of Croatia (ZAVNOH), amended and made more precise at the Second session of 
AVNOJ in Jajce, on 29 November 1943.
41 Zdenko Radelić, “Komunisti, križari i Katolička crkva,” Dijalog povjesničara-historičara, 
vol. 2 (Zagreb: 2000), p. 584.
42 D. Bilandžić, “Komunistička partija Hrvatske u socijalističkoj izgradnji,” Zbornik, Treći 
program radio Zagreba, vol. 17 (Zagreb: 1987), p. 5.
43 B. Jandrić, “Položaj katoličke crkve u Hrvatskoj u poslijeratnim godinama (1945.-1953.),” 
Croatica Christiana Periodica,  vol. 42 (Zagreb: 1998), p. 49. 
44 K. Spehnjak, “Prosvjetno - kulturna politika u Hrvatskoj 1945. – 1948,” ČSP 25 (Zagreb, 
1993), No. 1: 94.
45 On the occasion of the seizure and closing down of junior seminaries, Stepinac said: 
“What do we need the seminaries for if the rules of education will be given by Communist 
officers.” (L. Znidarčić, Alojzije Stepinac, p. 52.)
46 K. Spehnjak, “Uloga novina”, p. 94.
47 On 20 December 1945, the Presidency of the People’s Government of Croatia informs 
the Religion Commission “On the occasion of Christmas holidays and the New Year, the state 
offices will be open 24 December, on Christmas Eve until 12 o’clock, and on the Christmas 
Day, 25 December, and the day after, 26 December, the state offices will be closed. – General 
Secretary, Dr. Miloš Žanko. HDA, Commission for the Relations with Religious Communities, 
Record Group 310. General documents, 1945, issue pp. 801 – 1176. The State/Party tolerated 
celebrations of religious holidays (Christmas, Easter, Assumption of the Virgin Mary, etc.) 
until 1947. Gradually, that was being prohibited by the use of various forms of political and 
social pressure. The government was trying, whenever possible, to relate the celebration of
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attend.48 Operations like “taking off crosses from the school walls, abolish-
ing of prayer at the beginning of lessons, seizing of worship objects, abuse 
of children, youth and adults because of their faith”49 were the sign of the 
relations between the state and ecclesiastic authorities. However the Party 
organs did not always approve of such forms of “fighting” of their combat-
ant youth against religion, and some individuals were punished for their 
serious offences, but the Party punishments were not very strict. Regarding 
religion and the manifestation of religious awareness, the KPJ was espe-
cially strict on its own members, who were not “finished” with religion. Of 
course, there were Party members who were unconsciously expressing their 
religious world-view.50 During the discussions on the draft Constitution, in 
which the new legislative power introduced provisions on civil marriage, 
which were of course in contradiction with that of the Catholic Church, 
Stepinac fiercely criticised those provisions. 
The Serb Orthodox Church and the Islamic Religious Community also 
gave their comments on them.51 According to the Catholic religious norm, 
he [who?] requested that priority be given to religious marriage, or that 
“marriage can be entered before the competent ecclesiastic or state authori-
ty, depending on the free will of the persons entering marriage, and that all 
marriages must be registered at competent state authorities.”52 Furthermore, 
marriage disputes were to be solved before the ecclesiastic and not “people’s 
courts.” These proposals were rejected, because the state would, by leaving 
the marriage disputes to the Church, give up some of its sovereignty in judi-
ciary. [Namely, the Canonical law would be valid (church marriage – church 
jurisdiction), civil marriage (family law – state jurisdiction).] – [incomplete 
sentence, when would the law be valid?] The constitutional solution was that 
only register-office marriages were fully valid for the state, while church wed-
dings were just religious ceremonies, a compromise that encountered severe 
criticism from the Catholic clergy and religious organisations. Because of 
the “left-wing rigidity,” Party members were not allowed to attend religious 
ceremonies.53 Many Party members, because of their insufficient ideological 
“maturity” did not understand, that according to the KPJ Statute, they could 
be both believers and Communists at the same time. The Church was also 
religious holidays with the days important for the creation of the new state or those from the 
history of the labour movement. 
48 Under the slogan, “dok traje obnova, nema odmora” (no one rests during reconstructi-
on), the citizens had to participate “voluntarily” with a certain number of hours annually in 
the public works (building of cultural centres, playgrounds, parks, roads, etc.).   
49 J. Krišto, Katolička crkva, p. 38.
50 B. Jandrić, “Pojave i oblici kažnjavanja članstva komunističke partije Hrvatske (1945. - 
1952.),” ČSP 24 (Zagreb: 1992), No 1: 135.
51 HDA, Commission for the Relations with Religious Communities, Record Group 310. 
General documents, 1945, issue 16,  p. 800
52 B. Petranović, “Aktivnost rimokatoličkog klera,” p. 305. 
53 N. Kisić-Kolanović, “Problem legitimiteta”, p. 190.
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fighting for its congregation. It remained outside Communist control, and its 
activities could not be banned or efficiently controlled. Church was still rela-
tively in a materially good situation, and thus independent with an educated 
clergy. Therefore, it represented a potentially dangerous opponent to the exist-
ing totalitarian regime. As its activities could not be officially prohibited, the 
new Communist system could not “uncompromisingly persecute the church” 
because it would be unthinkable for international reasons. The Catholic 
Church therefore remained the only autonomous institution and refuge to 
all those in conflict with the new government. The repressive measures taken 
against parts of the clergy because of their “activities against the state” were 
considered to be appropriate methods of calming down the Church activities 
against the system, but it was first of all expected that “with the socialist devel-
opment of the society and the ideological influence on broader social classes 
the religiosity would gradually disappear.”54 In “getting straight” with the reli-
gious awareness, intellectuals were treated with the most rigidity. It was con-
sidered that religiosity was incompatible with their educational background 
and social status.  KPJ/KPH members from the peasantry were treated with 
the most tactfulness and patience in their release from the theist world-view 
and adopting the adequate behaviour patterns.55 
The conflict of the totalitarian Communist government with the Catholic 
Church was not typical only for Croatia, or Yugoslavia. The conflict trend 
Caricatures and jokes in satirical weekly 
Kerempuh attempted to present Stepinac
as war criminal
54 B. Jandrić, “Pojave i oblici”, p. 148.
55 Ibid.
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was also present in some other East European countries. Arrests, court proceed-
ings and sentences against high prelates (archbishops and cardinals) to long or 
short imprisonment occurred in the USSR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland 
and Albania. Apart from these states, Roman Catholic believers were being per-
secuted and harassed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Ukraine.
The Christian religion played an important role in the life of the Croatian 
population, and the Party needed to prepare the believers for the showdown 
with the Church. Stepinac did not want to make any concessions, and sug-
gested that the Communist government negotiate on the position of the 
Catholic Church directly with the Holy See. As the Communist government 
did not want to do that, the only option left was to put the repressive appa-
ratus in motion and bring him before the “people’s court.” In the prepara-
tions for the trial, the Party requested assistance from the people and want-
ed “the people to judge for themselves their Archbishop, before the court 
discussion on his guilt.”56 The government was threatening and forcing the 
citizens to attend the public meetings organised for that purpose. At the 
meetings, they were not only “talking against the Archbishop, the Church, 
and people of faith, but were also, in a very severe way, requesting the per-
sons present to speak their mind and, purportedly, speak ‘freely’ on the sub-
ject matter during the ‘discussion’, and of course to approve of the official 
standpoint and confirm the claims that Stepinac was a criminal.”57 Before 
the staged trial, which was launched year and a half after the war ended, 
the political organisations organised gatherings in front of the Archbishop’s 
manor to support the trial. “It does not matter we do not have profession-
al judges. /.../ What matters is that they have democratic ideas and that they 
are loyal to the Communist Party,”58 was the preparation for the final show-
down of the Communist government with the Church.
The launching of the trial,59 the judgement and the sentencing of Alojzije 
Stepinac shocked the world and caused much embarrassment to the 
Communist government. The prohibited and silenced Catholic faith was 
louder than the free one.60
On 23 September 1946, the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the NRH filed 
at the Supreme Court of the NRH the indictment against Archbishop 
56 L. Znidarčić, Alojzije Stepinac, p. 32
57 L. Znidarčić, Alojzije Stepinac, p. 73
58 V. Horvat, “Nadbiskup Alojzije Stepinac,” p. 161
59 The preparation for the launching of criminal proceedings lasted for almost a year. It was 
directed by  Dr. Josip Hrnčević, Josip Malović, Drago Desput, Dr. Božo Kraus. The process 
of inquest, investigation, the gathering of material, and other matters was directed by Ivan 
Krajačić. The investigation was carried out by OZN-a of Croatia, and the chief investigator 
was Nedo Milutinović, who was questioning the accused Stepinac during the investigation.
60 Protests and condemnations were coming to the Holy Father from all over the world. 
Many of the world’s newspapers, such as Times, Humanite, L’ Osservatore, International News 
Service, etc., were giving daily reports on the trial and the  sentencing of Archbishop Stepinac. 
Foreign Office in London received 550 petitions signed by 216,000 people, who protested 
against Stepinac’s imprisonment.  
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Stepinac.61 The Archbishop of Zagreb was the first and the only one in the 
900-year long history of the Bishopric/Archbishopric of Zagreb to be crim-
inally charged.  The indictment consisted of the following: 
 • Collaboration with the Italian and German occupiers during the war 
and the collaboration with the Ustasha regime in NDH, 
 • Forcing Orthodox believers to take on Catholicism,
 • Military vicarage,
 • The assisting of the Ustasha regime until its fall in May 1945,
 • Enemy propaganda (after 8 May 1945), qualified as slandering of the 
people’s government.
With the NRH Supreme Court decision62, and at the proposal of the 
Public Prosecutor Jakov Blažević63, on 24 September 1946, “the criminal 
proceedings against Erih Lisak, Ivan Šalić and others64 are merged with the 
criminal proceedings against Dr. Alojzije Stepinac.”65 The trial began on 
30 September 1946.66 The interrogation of Stepinac lasted until 3 October, 
and the trial finished on 8 October 1946. The court appointed two official 
defending barristers.67 Stepinac said that “he won’t say a word in his own 
defence, before the court that has the task to execute an order of a certain 
61 Makso Baće, Head of the Yugoslav OZN-a Department sent to Hrnčević photographs 
and documents related to the activities of Stepinac, Ustashas and Germans, as a draft to be 
used for the filing of the indictment. “As the material was not sufficient for the indictment, 
/.../ I hardly managed to examine a part of the investigation material and make the draft 
of the indictment introduction several typed pages long. /.../ When the work was finished, 
Jakov Blažević, Duško Brkić and myself /Hrnčević/ went to talk to Aleksandar Ranković, who 
was then on Bled /.../ and afterwards Tito received us and offered us a dinner.” (From: Josip 
Hrnčević, Svjedočanstva, (Zagreb: Globus, 1984), p. 174.). “Then, in 1946, we had several days 
of consultations with Tito, who gave us political and other bases for the criminal proceed-
ings. Tito realised, after several futile attempts, that that was an extremely hostile operation, 
irreconcilable. /.../ Edvard Kardelj was also there. We also spoke about Stepinac, on his hostile 
activities against the new Yugoslavia, and Tito said energetically: To hell with him!” (From: 
Jakov Blažević, Povijest i falsifikati (Samobor: Zagreb, 1983), p. 189.).     
62 The Court consisted of Dr. Žarko Vimplušek, President, Council Members, Dr. Ante 
Cerineo and Ivan Poldrugač, an additional judge, Ivan Pirker, and a court reporter, Dr. Ante 
Petrović. 
63 Composition of Public Prosecution:  Jakov Blažević, assistants Drago Desput and Dr. 
Božidar Kraus.
64 Other accused persons were: Josip Šimečki, Đuro Marić, Pavao Gulin, Josip Crnković, 
Modesto Martinčić, Krešo Klemen, Mamerto Margetić, Franjo Pavlek, Mirko Kolednjak, Josip 
Vidović, Stjepan Švasta, Ivan Ivanković, Josip Majnarić, Blaž Lorković, Ivan Kirin, Božidar 
Cerovski. (Comp.: Suđenje Lisaku, Stepincu, Šaliću i družini, ustaško-križarskim zličincima i 
njihovim pomagačima, (Zagreb: Rožanovski, 1946), (hereafter: Suđenje), pp. 1-32.). 
65 Suđenje, p. 19.
66 Having learnt of Archbishop Stepinac’s arrest, the congregation started voluntary and 
dignified protests in the streets. Out of fear of major incidents, OZNA banned gatherings 
and long stays of the congregation after mass in groups of more of five persons. (From: A. 
Benigar, Alojzije Stepinac, p. 526.).
67 The defending barristers ex officio were Dr. Ivo Politeo and Dr. Natko Katičić.
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organisation [KPJ/KPH], I shall not defend myself. Shoot me! Put me under 
the gallows, for I shall not speak,”68 that he refuses to have defending barris-
ters at the court, and “that he will not appeal against the court decision,” add-
ing that: “as a Catholic bishop according to the canonical law, this falls under 
the competence of the Holy See court, and not of the civil court.”69 The 
Archbishop defined his relationship with the NDH, in his speech before the 
court (on 3 October 1946): “You are accusing me of being the enemy of the 
state and of the people’s authorities. Please, tell me which authorities were 
in charge in 1941. Was it Simović in Belgrade or the traitor, as you call it, in 
London, or the one in Palestine or you in the woods? On the other hand, in 
1943 and 1944, was it the government in London or you in the woods? As 
far as I am concerned, you are the government in charge since 8 May 1945. 
Could I listen to you in the woods or those who were in Zagreb? Can one 
serve two masters? That cannot be in accordance with morality, the inter-
national or general human laws. We could not ignore the government here, 
even if it was the Ustasha government, because it was here. You have the right 
to ask questions and hold me to account since 8 May 1945”.70 About forcing 
Orthodox believers to take on Catholicism, Stepinac said: “I would like to 
make a remark as concerns the re-christening71 I am blamed for. Everyone, 
“The Shepherd and His Flock”. 
Comunist caricature published illus-
trated weekly Ilustrirani Vjesnik, No. 
57 of 22 September 1946. pp. 12-13.
68 A. Benigar, Alojzije Stepinac, p. 526.
69 Proces Alojziju Stepincu – dokumenti (Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost, 1997), p. 47.
70 Ibid., p. 48.
71 According to the church law, the Catholic Church recognises Orthodox christening; once 
christened, a person cannot and must not be christened again. Therefore, it is wrong to equate 
266
B. JANDRI∆, Preparation of the Staged Trial against A. S.  
even laymen who know some of the church law, understands clearly that a 
believer in the territory of another diocese, regardless of my permission for 
re-christening, would not be admitted into the Catholic Church, because 
only the relevant bishop can give such permission, so that it is absurd to 
charge me with re-christening of people from any territory other than the 
territory of the Archbishopric of Zagreb. Even the committee I was presid-
ing was a mere formality, and was not doing anything.  Regarding my ter-
ritory, I can be charged hundred times, but history will show that the con-
science of the Archbishop of Zagreb is totally clean in that respect. Why? 
Whoever wanted to be admitted into the Catholic Church, had to address 
us in writing through his parish office. If someone in the field does some-
thing without our written permission, it is a wrongdoing for which I, as the 
head of the Church, cannot be held responsible. Those were not cases of re-
christening, but a comedy, with which the church authorities have noth-
ing to do and for which then cannot be held responsible. All my collabora-
tors know that we were put before a dilemma whether to permit re-chris-
tening of those who asked for it or reject the request. If we permit that, after 
long consideration, there was some hope that they would get some help. If 
we reject the requests, the tears and cries of those people, as my collabora-
tors know, we would all the same now be accused for refusing to help Serbs, 
when they needed help, when the Catholic Church could have helped them, 
and we would be considered cruel and accused just like we are now.”72 
In the closing words of “his defence” he said: ”I was not persona grata for 
Germans and Ustashas. I was not an Ustasha, neither did I take their oath, 
as your clerks, who are present here, did. The Croatian people spoke in con-
sensus in favour of the Croatian state, and I would have been worthless if I 
had not felt the desire of the Croatian nation, which was a slave in the for-
mer Yugoslavia.”73 
The sentence was pronounced on 11 October of the same year.74 Stepinac 
was found guilty on all counts of the indictment. There were no extenuating 
circumstances. The ruling was: “The accused Dr. Alojzije Stepinac, pursuant 
to Art. 4 paras. 1 and 2 of the Act on Criminal Acts against the People and 
the State is sentenced to the deprivation of liberty with hard labour in the 
duration of 16 (sixteen) years, loss of political and civil rights in the dura-
tion of 5 (five) years. The time spent in the investigation prison between 18 
September and 11 October 1946” shall be deducted from the sentence.75 
“re-christening” (forced act) and “changing one’s religion” (“pure intention, without dishon-
ourable motives, with the belief in the trueness of Catholicism”). 
72 Proces A. Stepincu, p. 222. Document no. 10 dated 8 October 1946. Shorthand record of 
Archbishop Stepinac’s statement on the last day of the trial. Just for a note, Suđenje, p. 447., 
gives the first sentence only, and that one incorrectly; the whole Archbishop’s statement was 
left out, which is here presented in its full text.
73 L. Znidarčić, Alojzije Stepinac, p. 43.
74 Suđenje, p. 46.
75 Proces A. Stepincu, pp. 229 - 230
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IV.
Here will be presented some of the newspaper articles published in the 
period after the Pastoral Letter (20 September 1945) until the beginning of 
the Archbishop Stepinac’s trial (30 September 1946). The purpose of those 
articles was to prepare the public for the coming “event”- the trial against 
Stepinac.76
Two weeks after the Pastoral Letter was published, in October 1945, 
Vladimir Bakarić, the Prime Minister of the People’s Government of Croatia, 
said in an interview: ”This letter is the best evidence showing which side 
lacks good will to reach an appropriate solution to the relations between 
the Church and the State.”77 Furthermore, Bakarić stated  “that he is sur-
prised by the claims that the Church and the clergy are being persecuted. 
They are accusing us of sentencing to death the ‘innocent’ priests, and that 
we shot without trial ‘the opponents of the fascist ideology’ and, of course, 
totally innocent Franciscans from Široki Brijeg. /.../ Everybody could see 
in the Ustasha newspapers what sort of nest of treason that was, and that 
those Franciscans were preaching national hatred and organising slaugh-
ters. Almost all of them died with rifles in their hands, and among them 
were some Ustasha officials.”78 “I reiterate,” Bakarić continued, “that there is 
no persecution of the Church here. /.../ And now, we are addressing (more 
than once) the priests with the kind requests to work in their parishes, etc., 
on bringing our peoples closer”.79 
Under the headline “Most of the Ustasha cut-throats in Croatia were raised 
within clerical organisations”80 - Vjesnik published an article, which present-
ed the analysis of the situation since 1941 onwards, asking itself where the 
keepers of the faith and morals were in the last four years. “How did ‘the 
shepherds of their herds’ rule? Which of the Bishops of the Catholic Church 
in Croatia or Yugoslavia raised his voice against that merciless and brutal 
slaughter committed by Ustashas in Herzegovina, Bosnia, Lika, Dalmatia 
and elsewhere against the innocent Serbs, Croats, Jews and Gypsies? What 
did they do to prevent the torture and cruel killing of men, women and real-
ly innocent children in the notorious camps of Jasenovac, Stara Gradiška 
and others?”81 
The Prime Minister of Croatia gave a statement about the Ustasha activi-
ties within the ecclesiastic institutions, underlying: “It is not true that priests 
are being arrested and persecuted. There are, as far as I know, only sever-
76 B. Jandrić, “Državno - partijska priprema javnosti za suđenje nadbiskupu Stepincu, 
Proglašen krivim i prije započetog kaznenog procesa, (Example of the Zagreb paper 
“Vjesnik”)”, Croatica Christiana Periodica, vol. 42 (Zagreb: 1998), p. 49.
77 Vjesnik, 6 October 1945.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Vjesnik, 27 October 1945
81 Ibid.
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al priests imprisoned (Šalić, Crnković and Šimecki). They were put in pris-
on in relation with the investigation against Lisak, an Ustasha colonel, who 
has recently arrived to Zagreb in order to organise terrorist groups in the 
country.”82 “I think”, continued Bakarić “that the very behaviour of the high-
est clergy, at the end of the Ustasha rule and in the beginning of the libera-
tion, has shown that there is a strong link between the occupier and Ustashas 
and that part of the high clergy.”83
A part of that high clergy was, in Bakarić’s words, “helping the Ustasha 
criminals. It has been noticed for a long time now that in various church 
institutions there are footholds, or points, various channels, leading from the 
Ustashas abroad into the country. /.../ The fact (is) that Kaptol was sheltering 
the well-known Ustasha criminal Lisak. /.../ Our peoples will never again 
allow the church to become an institution which would be against the peo-
ple, and which would serve to foreign criminal and imperialistic aims. Only 
the church led by the people’s truly patriotic priests shall play and fulfil the 
mission assigned to it in the people’s life.”84
The headlines in the media represented the opinion of the Party, and were 
created in the “workshop” of CK KPH Agitprop, and that of “common work-
ers,” toward Stepinac and the Catholic Church, all with the purpose to pre-
pare the trial. They were supposed to “stir the flames” and instigate revolt 
and anger of the masses and create an anti-Catholic mood in the country. 
Here are some examples of those headlines: 
 • “A part of the Catholic clergy, under the pretext of ‘re-christening’ of 
Serbs, was luring our people into Ustasha slaughters.”85
 • “A part of the Catholic clergy was assisting all Ustasha crimes, even 
the killings of children. Archbishop Stepinac delivered partisan chil-
dren to the provident institution ‘Karitas’, to Ustasha sisters.”86
 • “Archbishop Dr. A. Stepinac was ordering his subordinate priests to 
pray for the butcher Pavelić.”87
 • “Archbishop Stepinac did not do anything to save seven Catholic 
priests from the Ustasha camp Jasenovac.”88
82 Vjesnik, 16 December 1945
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Vjesnik, 28 December 1945
86 Vjesnik, 9 January 1946
87 Vjesnik, 17 January 1946
88 Vjesnik, 26 January 1946; on 24 February 1943, Stepinac addressed Pavelić with a let-
ter saying: “I have been trying for months to find out the destiny of my seven clergymen, 
who were taken to Jasenovac. Everything in vain /.../ From all that I can conclude that they 
were all killed. Someone will say that they were hostile to the state. Why didn’t they take 
them to the court? If a regular court was not enough, why didn’t they take them before the 
court-martial, or at least before the mobile court-martial? This is a disgraceful stain and a 
crime, which cries to heaven for revenge, just as the whole Jasenovac is a disgraceful stain 
for the whole Independent State of Croatia.” (The Archiepiscopal Archive in Kaptol (here-
after NKA), Službeni vjesnik zagrebačke nadbiskupije issue. 6 – 3 December 1945, p. 35.).
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 • “The threads of the dirty business of the Archbishop of Zagreb against 
the people are cut off.”89
 • “During the occupation, we knew who Stepinac was. The people of 
Zagreb welcomed with joy the decision on bringing Stepinac before 
the court.”90
 • “Stepinac’s responsibility for forced re-christening of Serbs during the 
occupation.”91
 • “Numerous telegrams are coming from all over Croatia saluting 
Archbishop Stepinac’s arrest.”92
 • “We were waiting for long to see the inspirer of the Ustasha – Crusader 
crimes, Dr. Stepinac, stopped” – wrote the workers of the Obnova 
Company from Belgrade.93
 • “The leading people of the Catholic Church did not want to agree 
with the people’s authorities because they became agents of the occu-
piers during the war and want to remain foreign agents”94 Bakarić 
said during his lecture at the Student’s Home in Zagreb.
Unlike Vjesnik, which was informing the public almost daily, in texts not 
only about the coming trial, but also those mocking, insulting and slan-
dering the Catholic Church, clergy and the Archbishop, Borba was writing 
much less, in that period, about the Pastoral Letter and the Stepinac trial. It 
was mostly informing the public about the reactions to the Letter coming 
from all over Yugoslavia and Croatia, as well as about the radio programmes 
and newspaper articles from abroad. The purpose was the same, to prepare 
the public and to create negative public feeling for Stepinac and the Catholic 
Church.
V.
Several days before the trial, Vjesnik published an “indictment” under 
the title “Letters to Stepinac.” That was an indictment before the official 
one, the one of the Public Prosecutor. The text informed the public that 
“soon, Archbishop Dr. Alojzije Stepinac will be brought before the NRH 
Supreme Court Chamber, where he will be charged of being the ‘inspirer 
and the main organiser of the Ustasha-Crusader terrorism.’”95 The indict-
ment, which was filed in the name of the people against Stepinac by Public 
Prosecutor Blažević, also covered the period of the “traitorous” work dur-
ing the occupation. “From the fall of the former Yugoslavia until the lib-
89 Ibid.
90 Vjesnik, 22 September 1946.
91 Ibid.
92 Vjesnik, 25 September 1946.
93 Vjesnik, 28 September 1946.
94 Vjesnik, 30 September 1946.
95 Ibid. 
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eration of the homeland, Stepinac’s activities were just complementing 
Pavelić’s bloody orgies. Between 1941 and 1945, clerio-fascists were not only 
the main foothold of the Ustasha policy, but also the spiritual core of the 
Ustasha movement. /.../ With the ‘re-christening’ of Serbs, Stepinac and a 
part of the Catholic Church hierarchy helped Ustashas to slaughter hun-
dreds of thousands of the fraternal population. While the bandit’s Ustasha 
hordes were slaying, robbing, ruling the roost, Stepinac was shaking Pavelić’s 
hand, visiting the barracks and blessing the butchers of the Croatian people. 
/.../ The trial against Stepinac will establish what we all already know; it will 
establish that the most eminent Archbishop, in the so-called Ustasha state, 
was a factor with a special role. Together with Pavelić, he drew the sword 
against all glorious fighters for freedom and a better future of our people. 
/.../ Until now, in the process against Lisak, Šalić96 and others, facts have 
been revealed which accuse Stepinac as the head of all anti-people politi-
cal activities, which were supposed to be the preparation and a integral part 
of foreign intervention. The statements of the accused have shown the pur-
pose of the ‘Pastoral Letter,’ the relations between Kaptol and Stepinac’s lead-
ership with the Ustasha and Crusader terrorist organisations. /.../ Stepinac 
wanted to destroy the People’s Republic of Croatia and the Federal People’s 
Republic of Yugoslavia and to bring the criminals to power. /.../ The com-
plete criminal group led by Stepinacis in fact small, but ready to commit all 
sorts of crime. /.../ And thus Stepinac wanted bloodshed again; he wanted 
a war, a new invasion on Yugoslavia, although he knew that such invasion 
would bring about new destruction, thousands killed, more tears, /.../. That 
was just another crushing defeat of the bandit Stepinac’s policy /.../. With a 
strict but just judgement and punishment of all responsible for the tears and 
blood of the people, the Supreme Court Chamber of the People’s Republic of 
Croatia will firmly put an end to the bloody and mean betrayal, whose main 
base was in Kaptol, and the main leader – Stepinac.”97
VI.
The real purpose of the staged trial against Archbishop Stepinac was the 
separation of the Catholic Church from the Vatican. The top Party leaders 
were lamenting on the “people’s courts” and the “process” against Stepinac. 
On the objections to the work of the “people’s courts” and the questions of 
the Catholic Church about the process against Stepinac, Bakarić underlined 
two reasons: “The first reason for such situation was the former Yugoslavia, 
which was the dungeon of nations and which created the possibility of 
developing and stirring up of fratricidal hatred among our nations. Had it 
not been the case, no one would have been able to mislead so many Catholic 
priests. Another reason is the colossal Ustasha and Nazi propaganda present 
96 Joža Horvat and Zdenko Štambuk, ed. and published, Documents about the subversive 
activities and crimes of a part of the Catholic clergy (Zagreb: 1946).
97 Vjesnik, 23 September 1946.
271
 Review of Croatian History 1/2005, no.1., 253-272
in all church organisations and the Catholic press, by the responsible eccle-
siastic factors. That specially designed propaganda was in fact the prepara-
tion for the occupation of our country and the preparation for all suffer-
ings of our peoples during the occupation. The process, which was recent-
ly held in Zagreb, put light and pointed to many issues, which are impor-
tant for the judgement of our population toward certain ecclesiastic fac-
tors, and in that sense necessary decisions have been made. They often ask 
us: what do you want with that Church, to destroy it? Our answer is: no, 
we think that such decision would be stupid, that it would not be based on 
well-understood interests of the development of our people and the people’s 
state, and that it would hurt the religious feelings of our peoples. They say: 
do you want to separate the Church from the Pope; do you want to draw 
the Catholic Church in Croatia away from Rome and the Pope? Do you 
even consider that relation of the Church with the Pope to be a crime, etc.? 
We answer that question the way we already formulated our attitude. Our 
answer is: no, we do not intend to create a new schism or heretic Church. 
We would like the church to satisfy the religious needs of our peoples and to 
reflect the lives of the people. We only request and want the clergy to serve 
the religious needs of their nations. We do not interfere and do not want to 
interfere with the issues of dogmas and catechism, as well as the issues of the 
competence of the Holy See in these issues. I repeat that we only want our 
priests to serve the religious needs of our peoples and to listen to the peo-
ple, its political and national aspirations, to be sons of their people and to be 
driven, in those political and national issues, by the people’s thoughts and 
wishes, and only by those thoughts and wishes. (Long applause and accla-
mation). This is not and cannot be contrary to any religious dogma”.98 This 
was very different from the situation in 1945, when Stepinac was arrested. 
The Yugoslav authorities expressed their views on the process in numer-
ous pamphlets, puublished especially for that purpose.99 Before the sentence 
was pronounced, they offered Archbishop Stepinac a settlement, freedom, 
which he did not accept.  In addition to the condemnation of the Catholic 
Church and Stepinac, the process had another significant dimension, which 
was not publicly revealed at the trial, and which had long-reaching con-
sequences in the years to come and was reflected in the overall Croatian 
nation. It was also a “process against the Croatian homeland, which unfor-
tunately was always being identified with the fallen regime and its politi-
98 Speech of the Secretary of the National Front, Dr. Vladimir Bakarić – The Catholic 
Church Issue. HDA, Commission for the relations with religious communities, Record Group 
310. General documents, no. 200 - 374 dated 15 October 1946
99 In this context, it is very interesting that the Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington sta-
ted in front of the members of the American Committee for Assistance to Yugoslavia that 
“Stepinac had been supporting the plot, hatched during the war, whose aim had been to found 
a new state in the Catholic central Europe, consisting of Croatia, Slovenia, Austria, Hungary, 
Slovakia and maybe Bavaria, headed by Otto von Habsburg.” (From: Stella Alexander, Church 
and State in Yugoslavia since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 117.).
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cal aspirations.”100 It is not surprising that “Stepinac became a symbol of the 
gravely and wrongly accused nation.”101 
Translated by Ida Jurković
Die Presse der totalitärten kommunistischen Behörden in Kroatien 
im Vorfeld des Schauprozesses gegen Zagreber Erzbischof 
Alojzije Stepinac (1946)
Zusammenfassung
«Vater vergib ihnen, denn sie wissen nicht, was sie tun!»
(Lk 23, 34)
Die kommunistische (totalitäre) Regierung im ehemaligen sozialistischen 
Jugoslawien hielt es für notwendig im Konflikt mit der katholischen Kirche, unmit-
telbar vor dem Prozessauftakt gegen den Zagreber Erzbischof Alojzije Stepinac, 
auf die öffentliche Meinung einzuwirken und diese für sich zu gewinnen. Die 
Manipulation mit der öffentlichen Meinung war der erste Schritt in diesem Prozeß. 
Die Grundaufgabe der Presse war, die öffentliche Meinung gegen die katholische 
Kirche und den Erzbischof aufzuhetzen. Ein Großteil der Zeitungsartikel im meist-
gelesenen und auflagenstärksten Zagreber Tagesblatt Vjesnik und dem Organ der 
Kommunistischen Partei Jugoslawiens, Borba, sollte den Beistand der Volksmassen 
im bevorstehenden Prozess gegen das Oberhaupt der katholischen Kirche in 
Kroatien sichern, das  zum Tod oder langjähriger Gefängnisstrafe zu verurteilen 
war. Bereits vor dem Gerichtsprozess hatte die Presse Erzbischof Stepinac für 
schuldig erklärt. Der Autor dieses Beitrags stellte das ausführlich durch eine einge-
hende Analyse von Zeitungsberichten dar.
100 A. Benigar, Alojzije Stepinac, p. 587.
101 Stjepan Kožul, Spomenica žrtvama ljubavi zagrebačke nadbiskupije (Zagreb: Nadbiskupski 
stol, 1992), p. 14.
